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Elements of a Theory of Human Rights

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## I. THE NEED FOR A THEORY

Few concepts are as frequently invoked in contemporary political discussions as human rights. There is something deeply attractive in the idea that every person anywhere in the world, irrespective of citizenship or territorial legislation, has some basic rights, which others should respect. The moral appeal of human rights has been used for a variety of purposes, from resisting torture and arbitrary incarceration to demanding the end of hunger and of medical neglect.<sup>1</sup>

At the same time, the central idea of human rights as something that people have, and have even without any specific legislation, is seen by many as foundationally dubious and lacking in cogency. A recurrent question is, Where do these rights come from? It is not usually disputed that the invoking of human rights can be politically powerful. Rather, the worries relate to what is taken to be the “softness” (some would say “mushiness”) of the conceptual grounding of human rights. Many philosophers and legal theorists see the rhetoric of human rights as just

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1. See *International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics and Morals*, ed. Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Richard Falk, *Human Rights Horizons: The Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing World* (New York: Routledge, 2000); Jack Donnelly, *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice*, 2nd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). See also Micheline R. Ishay, *The Human Rights Reader: Major Political Writings, Essays, Speeches, and Documents from the Bible to the Present* (New York: Routledge, 1997).

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loose talk—perhaps kindly and well meaning forms of locution—but loose talk nevertheless.

The contrast between the widespread use of the idea of human rights and the intellectual skepticism about its conceptual soundness is not new. The U.S. Declaration of Independence, in 1776, took it to be “self-evident” that everyone is “endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights,” and thirteen years later, the French declaration of “the rights of man” asserted that “men are born and remain free and equal in rights.” But it did not take Jeremy Bentham long, in his *Anarchical Fallacies* written during 1791 and 1792 (aimed against the French “rights of man”), to propose the total dismissal of all such claims. Bentham insisted that “natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights (an American phrase), rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts.”<sup>2</sup> That suspicion remains very alive today, and despite persistent use of the idea of human rights in practical affairs, there are many who see the idea of human rights as no more than “bawling upon paper,” to use another of Bentham’s barbed portrayals of natural right claims.

The dismissal of human rights is often comprehensive and is aimed against any belief in the existence of rights that people can have unconditionally, simply by virtue of their humanity (rather than having them contingently, on the basis of specific qualifications, such as citizenship or legal entitlements). Some critics, however, propose a discriminating rejection: they accept the general idea of human rights but exclude, from the acceptable list, specific classes of proposed rights, in particular the so-called economic and social rights, or welfare rights. These rights, which are sometimes referred to as second generation rights, such as a common entitlement to subsistence or to medical care, have mostly been added relatively recently to earlier enunciations of human rights, thereby vastly expanding the claimed domain of human rights.<sup>3</sup> These

2. Jeremy Bentham, *Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of the Declaration of Rights Issued during the French Revolution* (1792); republished in *The Works of Jeremy Bentham*, vol. II, ed. J. Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843), p. 501.

3. See Ivan Hare, “Social Rights as Foundational Human Rights,” in *Social and Labour Rights in Global Context*, ed. Bob Hepple (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), and William F. Felice, *The Global New Deal: Economic and Social Human Rights in World Politics* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). See also Cass R. Sunstein, *After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), and Thomas W. Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms* (London: Polity Press, 2002).

additions have certainly taken the contemporary literature on human rights well beyond the eighteenth-century declarations that concentrated on a narrower class of “rights of man,” including such demands as personal liberty and political freedom. These newer inclusions have been subjected to more specialized skepticism, with the critics focusing on their feasibility problems and their dependence on specific social institutions that may or may not exist.<sup>4</sup>

Human rights activists are often quite impatient with such critiques. The invoking of human rights tends to come mostly from those who are concerned with changing the world rather than interpreting it (to use a classic distinction made famous, oddly enough, by that overarching theorist, Karl Marx). It is not hard to understand their unwillingness to spend time trying to provide conceptual justification, given the great urgency to respond to terrible deprivations around the world. This proactive stance has had its practical rewards, since it has allowed immediate use of the colossal appeal of the idea of human rights to confront intense oppression or great misery, without having to wait for the theoretical air to clear. However, the conceptual doubts must also be satisfactorily addressed, if the idea of human rights is to command reasoned loyalty and to establish a secure intellectual standing. It is critically important to see the relationship between the force and appeal of human rights, on the one hand, and their reasoned justification and scrutinized use, on the other.

There is, thus, need for some theory and also for some defense of any proposed theory. The object of this article is to do just that, and to consider, in that context, the justification of the general idea of human rights and also of the includability of economic and social rights within the broad class of human rights. For such a theory to be viable it is necessary to clarify what kind of a claim is made by a declaration of human rights, and how such a claim can be defended, and furthermore how the diverse criticisms of the coherence, cogency and legitimacy of human

4. The reasoning behind such rejection has been powerfully presented by Maurice Cranston, “Are There Any Human Rights?” *Daedalus* (1983): 1–17, and Onora O’Neill, *Towards Justice and Virtue* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). See also the critique of Michael Ignatieff, supporting some claims to human rights while strongly disputing others, in *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

rights (including economic and social rights) can be adequately addressed. That is the aim of this article.

However, before going into this investigation, I should make a clarificatory point. The rhetoric of human rights is sometimes applied to particular legislations inspired by the idea of human rights. There is clearly no great difficulty in seeing the obvious judicial status of these already legalized entitlements. No matter what they are called (“human rights laws” or any other appellation), they stand shoulder to shoulder with other established legislations. The present inquiry on the foundations and cogency of human rights does not have any direct bearing on the obvious *legal* status of these “human rights laws,” once they have been properly legislated. As far as these laws are concerned, the relevance, if any, of this study would lie, rather, in the *motivation* that leads to the enacting of such laws, which builds on the pre-legislative standing of these claims.

Indeed, a great many acts of legislation and legal conventions (such as the “European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”) have been clearly inspired by a belief in some pre-existing rights of all human beings. This applies even to the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, linked to the normative vision of the U.S. Declaration of Independence (as was noted earlier). The difficult questions regarding the status and standing of human rights arise in the domain of ideas, before such legalization occurs. We also have to examine whether legislation is the pre-eminent, or even a necessary, route through which human rights can be pursued.

## II. QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED

A theory of human rights must address the following questions in particular:

- (1) What kind of a statement does a declaration of human rights make?
- (2) What makes human rights important?
- (3) What duties and obligations do human rights generate?
- (4) Through what forms of actions can human rights be promoted, and in particular whether legislation must be the principal, or even a necessary, means of implementation of human rights?

(5) Can economic and social rights (the so-called second generation rights) be reasonably included among human rights?

(6) Last but not least, how can proposals of human rights be defended or challenged, and how should their claim to a universal status be assessed, especially in a world with much cultural variation and widely diverse practice?

These questions are addressed sequentially in what follows. However, since this is not a detective story, I am perhaps allowed to give away a sketch of the proposed answers, with the hope that this might help in following this long and not entirely uncomplicated article (even though there is some risk of oversimplification involved in any summary formulation).

(1) Human rights can be seen as primarily ethical demands. They are not principally “legal,” “proto-legal” or “ideal-legal” commands. Even though human rights can, and often do, inspire legislation, this is a further fact, rather than a constitutive characteristic of human rights.

(2) The importance of human rights relates to the significance of the freedoms that form the subject matter of these rights. Both the opportunity aspect and the process aspect of freedoms can figure in human rights. To qualify as the basis of human rights, the freedoms to be defended or advanced must satisfy some “threshold conditions” of (i) special importance and (ii) social influenceability.

(3) Human rights generate reasons for action for agents who are in a position to help in the promoting or safeguarding of the underlying freedoms. The induced obligations primarily involve the duty to give reasonable consideration to the reasons for action and their practical implications, taking into account the relevant parameters of the individual case. The reasons for action can support both “perfect” obligations as well as “imperfect” ones, which are less precisely characterized. Even though they differ in content, imperfect obligations are correlative with human rights in much the same way as perfect obligations are. In particular, the acceptance of imperfect obligations goes beyond volunteered charity or elective virtues.

(4) The implementation of human rights can go well beyond legislation, and a theory of human rights cannot be sensibly confined within the juridical model in which it is frequently incarcerated. For example, public recognition and agitation (including the monitoring of violations)

can be part of the obligations—often imperfect—generated by the acknowledgment of human rights. Also, some recognized human rights are not ideally legislated, but are better promoted through other means, including public discussion, appraisal and advocacy (a basic point that would have come as no surprise to Mary Wollstonecraft, whose *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman: with Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects* was published in 1792).

(5) Human rights can include significant and influenceable economic and social freedoms. If they cannot be realized because of inadequate institutionalization, then, to work for institutional expansion or reform can be a part of the obligations generated by the recognition of these rights. The current unrealizability of any accepted human right, which can be promoted through institutional or political change, does not, by itself, convert that claim into a *non-right*.

(6) The universality of human rights relates to the idea of survivability in unobstructed discussion—open to participation by persons across national boundaries. Partisanship is avoided not so much by taking either a *conjunction*, or an *intersection*, of the views respectively held by dominant voices in different societies across the world (including very repressive ones), but through an *interactive* process, in particular by examining what would survive in public discussion, given a reasonably free flow of information and uncurbed opportunity to discuss differing points of view. Adam Smith's insistence that ethical scrutiny requires examining moral beliefs from, inter alia, "a certain distance" has a direct bearing on the connection of human rights to global public reasoning.

### III. HUMAN RIGHTS: ETHICS AND LAW

What kind of an assertion does a declaration of human rights make? I would submit that proclamations of human rights are to be seen as articulations of ethical demands. They are, in this respect, comparable with pronouncements in utilitarian ethics, even though their respective substantive contents are, obviously, very different. Like other ethical claims that demand acceptance, there is an implicit presumption in making pronouncements on human rights that the underlying ethical claims will survive open and informed scrutiny. Indeed, the invoking of such an

interactive process of critical scrutiny, open to information (including that about other societies) as well as to arguments coming from far as well as near, is a central feature of the theory of human rights proposed here. It differs both (i) from trying to justify the ethics of human rights in terms of shared—and already established—universal values (the uncomplicated “non-partisan” view), and (ii) from abdicating any claim of adherence to universal values (and in this sense, eschewing any claim to being “non-partisan”) in favor of a particular political conception that is suitable to the contemporary world.<sup>5</sup>

These issues, which relate to the foundational discipline of ethical critique, will be examined later, in Section IX, in response to question (6). But the point to note for the moment, in answer to the first question, is that pronouncements of human rights are quintessentially ethical articulations, and they are *not*, in particular, putative legal claims, despite considerable confusion on this point, generated not least by Jeremy Bentham, the obsessive slayer of what he took to be legal pretensions. (I shall return later in this section to the nature of the misapprehension involved.)

A pronouncement of human rights includes an assertion of the importance of the corresponding freedoms—the freedoms that are identified and privileged in the formulation of the rights in question—and is indeed motivated by that importance. For example, the human right of not being tortured springs from the importance of freedom from torture for all. But it includes, furthermore, an affirmation of the need for others to consider what they can reasonably do to secure the freedom from torture for any person. For a would-be torturer, the demand is obviously quite straightforward, to wit, to refrain and desist. The demand takes the clear form of what Immanuel Kant called a perfect obligation.<sup>6</sup> However, for others too (that is, those other than the would-be torturers) there are responsibilities, even though they are less specific and come in the general form of “imperfect obligations” (to invoke another Kantian

5. There are different variants of these two contrasting positions, and also other alternatives that differ from both, which are helpfully discussed and distinguished in Charles Beitz, “Human Rights as a Common Concern,” *American Political Science Review* 95 (June 2001): 269–82.

6. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), trans. L. W. Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956).

concept).<sup>7</sup> The perfectly specified demand not to torture anyone is supplemented by the more general, and less exactly specified, requirement to consider the ways and means through which torture can be prevented and then to decide what one should, thus, reasonably do. The relations between human rights, freedoms, and obligations will be further investigated in Sections IV through VI.

Even though recognitions of human rights (with their associated claims and obligations) are ethical affirmations, they need not, by themselves, deliver a complete blueprint for evaluative assessment. An agreement on human rights does involve a firm commitment, to wit, to give reasonable consideration to the duties that follow from that ethical endorsement. But even with agreement on these affirmations, there can still be serious debates, particularly in the case of imperfect obligations, on (i) the ways in which the attention that is owed to human rights should be best paid, (ii) how the different types of human rights should be weighed against each other and their respective demands integrated together, (iii) how the claims of human rights should be consolidated with other evaluative concerns that may also deserve ethical attention, and so on.<sup>8</sup> A theory of human rights can leave room for further discussions, disputations and arguments. The approach of open public reasoning, which is central to the understanding of human rights as proposed here, can definitively settle some disputes about coverage and content (including the identification of some clearly sustainable rights and others that would be hard to sustain), but may have to leave others, at least tentatively, unsettled.<sup>9</sup> The admissibility of a

7. I have discussed, in an earlier paper, the relevance of the Kantian distinction between “perfect” and “imperfect” obligations even for a largely consequentialist framework. “Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason,” *Journal of Philosophy* 97 (2000): 477–502.

8. Some of the central issues are discussed by John Mackie, “Can There Be a Rights-based Moral Theory?” *Studies in Ethical Theory: Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 3, ed. Peter A. French, et al. (Morris : University of Minnesota, 1978). Reprinted in *Theories of Rights*, ed. Jeremy Waldron (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 168–81.

9. This applies not only to the persistence of interpersonal disagreements, but also to specific areas of unresolved disputes within one person’s own reasoned assessment. An adequate theory of rationality has to make room for such “incompleteness” of assessment. The general issue of admissibility of incompleteness is discussed in my *Collective Choice and Social Welfare* (San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1970; republished, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979); “Maximization and the Act of Choice,” *Econometrica* 65 (1997): 745–80,

domain of continued dispute is no embarrassment to a theory of human rights.<sup>10</sup>

In practical applications of human rights, such debates are, of course, quite common and entirely customary, particularly among human rights activists. What is being argued here is that the possibility of such debates—without losing the basic recognition of the importance of human rights—is not just a feature of what can be called human rights *practice*, they are actually part of the general *discipline* of human rights including the underlying theory (rather than being an embarrassment to that discipline). An acknowledgment of the necessity to pay ethical attention to human rights, far from obliterating the need for such deliberation, actually invites it. A theory of human rights can, therefore, allow considerable internal variations, without losing the commonality of the agreed principle of attaching substantial importance to human rights (and to the corresponding freedoms and obligations) and of being committed to considering seriously how that importance should be appropriately reflected.

Variability of this kind is not only not an embarrassment, it tends to be standardly present in all general theories of substantive ethics. Indeed, a similar diversity can be found within utility-centered ethics, even though this feature of that large ethical discipline often receives little or no recognition. In the case of utility-based reasoning, variations can arise not only from the different ways in which utilities can be interpreted (as *pleasures*, fulfillment of *desires*, or realization of *choices*),<sup>11</sup> nor only from the acknowledged heterogeneity of utilities themselves (well

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reprinted in *Rationality and Freedom* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002); and also “Incompleteness and Reasoned Choice,” *Synthese* (forthcoming 2004). See also Isaac Levi, *Hard Choices: Decision Making under Unresolved Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), and Hilary Putnam, “Über die Rationalität von Präferenzen,” *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 21 (1996): 204–28, English version, “On the Rationality of Preferences,” in his *The Collapse of the Fact / Value Dichotomy and Other Essays* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002).

10. Also, as Jeremy Waldron has argued, disagreement about rights “is a sign—the best possible sign in modern circumstances—that people *take rights seriously*.” See *Law and Disagreement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 311.

11. See Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (London: Payne, 1789; republished, Oxford: Clarendon Press); Henry Sidgwick, *The Method of Ethics* (London: Macmillan, 1874); A. C. Pigou, *The Economics of Welfare* (London: MacMillan, 1920); Frank P. Ramsey, *Foundations: Essays in Philosophy, Logic, Mathematics*

recognized by both Aristotle and John Stuart Mill).<sup>12</sup> They can also arise from the diversity of ways in which utilities can be used, whether by mere *addition*, or by *multiplication* (after suitable normalization), or through the *addition of concave transformations* of utility functions, all of which have been proposed and pursued, within the discipline of utility-based evaluation.<sup>13</sup> Further, the discipline of interpersonal comparison of utilities may itself allow alternative procedures of quantification of utilities and go comfortably with accommodating permissible variations within specified classes of “partial comparability.”<sup>14</sup> The existence of different ways of making use of utility-based reasoning and alternative utilitarian procedures does not invalidate or even undermine the general approach of utility-centered ethics. And, similarly, the ethics of human rights is not nullified or thwarted by internal variations that it allows and incorporates.

Thus, the analogy between articulations of human rights and utilitarian pronouncements has considerable perspicacity, even though the great founder of modern utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham, managed to miss that connection altogether in his classic hatchet job on natural rights in general and on the “rights of man” in particular. Bentham took

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*and Economics* (London: Routledge, 1978); Richard M. Hare, *Freedom and Reason* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963); J.C.B. Gosling, *Pleasure and Desire* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969); Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); R. E. Goodin, “Laundering Preferences,” in *The Foundations of Social Choice Theory*, ed. Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 75–101; James Griffin, *Well-being* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); John Broome, *Weighing Goods* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991); among many other contributions.

12. See Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. David Ross, rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), and John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism* (London, 1861; republished London: Collins/Fontana, 1962). I have discussed the issues involved in “Plural Utility,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 81 (1980–81): 193–215.

13. See John F. Nash, “The Bargaining Problem,” *Econometrica* 18 (1950): 155–62; John C. Harsanyi, “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility,” *Journal of Political Economy* 63 (1955): 309–21; James A. Mirrlees, “An Exploration of the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation,” *Review of Economic Studies* 38 (1971): 175–208.

14. These issues are discussed in Amartya Sen, “Interpersonal Aggregation and Partial Comparability,” *Econometrica* 38 (1970): 393–409, and *Choice, Welfare and Measurement* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982; republished, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997); Charles Blackorby, “Degrees of Cardinality and Aggregate Partial Orderings,” *Econometrica* 43 (1975): 845–52; Ben J. Fine, “A Note on ‘Interpersonal Aggregation and Partial Comparability,’” *Econometrica* 43 (1975): 169–72; *Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-beings*, ed. Jon Elster and John Roemer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

the appropriate comparison to be that between the legal significance, respectively of: (1) declarations of human rights, and (2) actually legislated rights. Not surprisingly, he found the former to be essentially lacking in legal status in the way the latter, obviously enough, would have. Bentham's dismissal of human rights came, thus, with amazingly swiftness.

*Right*, the substantive *right*, is the child of law; from *real* laws come *real* rights; but from *imaginary* laws, from "law of nature" [can come only] "*imaginary* rights."<sup>15</sup>

It is easy to see that Bentham's rejection of the idea of natural "rights of man" depends substantially on the rhetoric of privileged use of the term "rights," seeing it in its specifically legal interpretation. However, insofar as human rights are meant to be significant ethical claims, the pointer to the fact that they do not by themselves have legal or institutional force is obvious enough, but also quite irrelevant to the discipline of human rights.<sup>16</sup> The appropriate comparison is, surely, between:

- (1) a utility-based ethics (championed by Bentham himself), which sees intrinsic ethical importance in utilities but none in human rights or human freedoms (any role that the latter can have in the utilitarian system is, thus, entirely instrumental), and
- (2) an ethics that makes room for the fundamental significance of human rights (as the advocates of "rights of man" did), linked with a diagnosis of the basic importance of human freedoms and the obligations generated by that diagnosis.<sup>17</sup>

15. Jeremy Bentham, *Anarchical Fallacies*, in *Collected Works*, vol. II, p. 523.

16. Accepting a general contrast between the respective categories of ethical assertions and legal pronouncements does not, of course, deny the possibility that ethical views may contribute to the interpretation and, thus, the substantive content of laws. The recognition of that possibility may go against a strictly positivist theory of law (on which see Ronald Dworkin, *A Matter of Principle* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985]). This understanding does not, however, obliterate the motivational and substantive distinction between primarily ethical claims and principally legal proclamations.

17. The importance of rights and freedoms can, of course, be combined with incorporating the significance of utility or well-being in ethical reasoning, but if such a "combined" system is to be pursued, some consistency problems will have to be faced in devising a coherent and integrated social choice procedure; on this see Amartya Sen, "The

Just as utilitarian ethical reasoning takes the form of insisting that the utilities of the relevant persons must be taken into account in deciding on what should be done, the human rights approach demands that the acknowledged human rights must be given ethical recognition (the form and the informational basis of that recognition will be discussed further in the next two sections). The relevant comparison lies in this contrast, *not* in differentiating the legal force of legislated rights (for which Bentham's phrase "the child of law" is an appropriate description) from the absence of any legal standing generated by an ethical recognition of rights (without any legislation or legal reinterpretation). Indeed, even as Bentham was busy in 1791 and 1792 writing down his dismissal of "rights of man," the reach and range of ethical interpretations of rights were being powerfully explored by Thomas Paine's *Rights of Man*, and by Mary Wollstonecraft's *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman: with Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects*, both published during the period 1791 to 1792 (though neither seemed to arouse Bentham's curiosity).<sup>18</sup>

An ethical understanding of human rights goes not only against seeing them as legal demands (and against taking them to be, as in Bentham's view, legal *pretensions*), but also differs from a law-centered approach to human rights that sees them as if they are basically *grounds* for law, almost "laws in waiting." Ethical and legal rights do, of course, have motivational connections. In a rightly celebrated article "Are There Any Natural Rights?" Herbert Hart has argued that people "speak of their moral rights mainly when advocating their incorporation in a legal system." He added that the concept of a right "belongs to that branch of morality which is specifically concerned to determine when one person's freedom may be limited by another's and so to determine what actions may appropriately be made the subject of coercive legal

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Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," *Journal of Political Economy* 78 (1970): 152–57, and *Rationality and Freedom* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), essays 12–14 and 20–22. See also Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), and the special number of *Analyse & Kritik* 18 (1996) on "the Liberal Paradox," particularly Kotaro Suzumura, "Welfare, Rights and Social Choice Procedures," pp. 20–37.

18. Thomas Paine, *The Rights of Man: Being an Answer to Mr. Burke's Attack on the French Revolution* (1791); second part, *Combining Principle and Practice* (1792); republished, *The Rights of Man* (London: Dent, and New York: Dutton, 1906). Mary Wollstonecraft, *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792); republished, *The Rights of Woman* (London: Dent, and New York: Dutton, 1929).