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Fowke led corrupt bureaucrats scamming tax dollars
Privacy commissioner to investigate City hall legal expenses complaint

Fowke: Incompetent and
negligence
WikiLeaks
Sudbury has uncovered that a large number of tax dollars has
been spent to cover-up incompetent of City bureaucrats. Ken
Fowke, General Manager Corporate services, and Eric Lablle,
City Solicitor were involved with this scandal. Fowke and
Labelle were generous to arrange millions of dollars worth
retainers with legal firms and benefitted from the kick back
and pocketed thousands of tax dollars. WikiLeaks Sudbury
follows all leads available to uncover and obtain full access
to the records, specifically tax dollars paid for labour and
employment matters.
Kosnik
doing dirty laundry

Kosnik: Mouth piece against public trust |
Recently
added, the Manger to the corrupt regime, Kosnik is assigned to protect
City’s mafia group and act as a mouthpiece for the same group.
Bigger’s willful blindness and
political corruptness is a main and leading factor for the waste of tax
dollars. City’s bureaucrats are now taking every effort to hide
unnecessary legal expenses paid for labour and employment matters.
WikiLeaks Sudbury legal team allocates all available resources to defeat
the conspiracy against Sudbury taxpayers plotted by Fowke and Lablle leads
mafia at the City hall.
Since
before he was elected mayor, Brian Bigger has operated in the belief that
he can control his narrative through sheer force of will — and words.
Day after day, he floods the airwaves with messages — ad-libbed
speeches, off the cuff remarks — whose effect is to keep Sudbury’s
attention squarely on him.
But
this week, Bigger’s relentless stream of words seem to have come back to
haunt him, and may yet make the mayor want to reconsider his “it’s all
about me” communications strategy. Bigger’s problems largely grew out
of things that he himself is alleged to have said. His state of City
address, is only an empty drum and nothing more.
Bigger’s
all promises returned with emptiness and failure to address City hall
corruption. Bigger, appointed his close allies to protect his interest and
his will full blindness, add additional burden to taxpayers. The property
tax, water and wastewater bills, are expected to go up again.
Bigger’s
close ally, Kevin Fowke, General Manager Corporate Services, maintain the
secrecy of the City hall with the support of legal services department.
Their attempt to hide legal fees paid for legal companies is one of the
ideal examples. Fowke has no respect for the tax dollars and he is facing
allegations for spending over $100,000 legal fees for a Toronto lawyer,
for one of the labour and employment matters. According to the sources
available for WikiLeaks Sudbury, the resolution to the matter cost
was only $20.00.
Moreover,
WikiLeaks Sudbury sources state that, the Bigger insisted that the City
staffers continue to keep their heads down and do their jobs as this
scandal is unfolding.
WikiLeaks
Sudbury will be releasing more details soon after they are available. Stay
tuned.
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Editorial
Released on June 15, 2018 22:10 EDT This
article originally published on Baltic
Journal of Management, 7( 3), 287-301
(2012). Brief
overview and excerpts of the articles as follows:
Tackling
corruption
This
paper represents a response to the need to understand the
relations between managerial attitudes, organizational culture
and corruption in organisations. The study reported in this
paper focuses on two main issues. First and foremost, it aims to
describe how top managers perceive their role in implementing
anti-corruption measures in their organizations. In terms of
corruption, they postulate the existence of two types of
organisational culture. In the first case, the organisation’s
declared values are compatible with the values it practises, in
the second case its anti corruption values are not followed in
practice and may thus indirectly even contribute to corruption.
Most of the researchers writing on the subject have focused on
macro-level determinants of corruption such as economics,
culture, history, or political system.T hose who have stressed
micro-level or organisational causes have mainly concentrated on
the structural variables of corruption in organisations.
Although micro-level studies of corruption to explore the links
between specific leadership styles and integrity in police
organisations exist they are very rare. Despite considerable
interest among academics in the effects of ethical leadership
styles and role-modelling on organisational culture, precious
few attempts have been made to understand the values of managers
in law enforcement agencies and the correlation of these values
to corruption. In part, this could be due to a certain
reluctance among many researchers directly to approach law
enforcement managers.
Moralists
and behaviourists see corruption as “an immoral phenomenon”,
which manifests itself in “selfish and improper conduct” of
individuals. Institutionalists, on the other hand, stress the
importance of social context and the fact that “social choices
are shaped, mediated, and channelled by institutional
arrangements”. Individual characteristics alone are not
sufficient to account for a person’s deviant behaviour. It has
been suggested that illegal and deviant behaviour by members of
an organisation is in part induced by the unfair treatment that
they experience in the organisation or by unethical actions on
the part of their supervisors and that the management’s unjust
actions and/or decisions may result in counterproductive
behaviour on the part of employees. Some researchers attribute
the occurrence of corruption in societies to the insufficient
professionalism and low ethical standards of officials serving
in their government institutions while others consider this view
to be tantamount to individualising a phenomenon that should
properly be regarded as societal and cultural. However, the poor
performance of civil servants may also simply reflect a weak
organisational culture and mediocre management.
Weak
legal system can be a source of corruption and a consequence of
corruption at the same time. Ineffective legal system, complex
and ambiguous regulations that allow multiple interpretations
may encourage the use of position for personal gain, and
consequently reduce the effectiveness of the laws and their
enforcers through political appointments or through reducing and
allocating resources. It is common knowledge that mere existence
of severe and inflexible laws does not guarantee that they are
actually observed. These are laws that impose a prevailing value
judgment in cases to which that judgment should not apply (for
instance, where the corresponding behaviour causes no harm to
anyone). Sanctions, too, may turn out to be counterproductive
– although they are likely to inhibit people from acting in a
way that attracts a particular punishment, they may also weaken
the moral authority of the rules that prescribe the punishment.
If a sanction is removed, people may still continue to behave in
the way they consider to be morally right. Thus, sanctions are
likely to yield positive effects only when they persuade people
that the prohibited act or course of action is immoral.
The
defensiveness and passiveness of the managers can be attributed
to several reasons – for example, it would be short-sighted on
the part of managers to express mistrust of their employees and
to admit problems in their organisations. This defensiveness and
lack of self-criticism may be part of the overall managerial
culture in
organization
and departments in
general. The lack of leadership skills, a fear of making
mistakes and the tendency to self-justification all hamper the
proactive development of managerial culture. Furthermore, it has
been argued that central and isolated
municipalities suffer
from poor policy analysis and insufficient management
experience. Sudbury case is an ideal
example.
Editor
WikiLeaks Sudbury
June 2018
Reference
Soot M. (2012). The role
of management in tackling corruption. Baltic Journal of Management,
7( 3), 287-301
.
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Tackling
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