Released on September
12, 2015 at 21:00 EDT
Tag #: 682
rides the merry-go-round...failing to keep his promises to taxpayers
department running on deficit
Incompetent Benkovich still on the job eating up tax dollars
Incompetent and controversial practices
city's incompetent water and wastewater director, Benkovich, is still on
the job and defrauding tax dollars continues as he has absolutely no
respect for tax dollars. It was reported that as of March 2015, the water
and wastewater division was over budget by $2.8 million.
has played his usual card in front of taxpayers stating that the water
main breaks were the result of extreme winter weather conditions and aging
infrastructure. He further stated that this was also the reason for the
impact on additional expenditures. Benkovich made a sweet deal with one of
the contractors and a large amount of tax dollars were paid for the
service. The contract was also renewed without any competitive bidding. Wikileaks
Sudbury will not disclose identifiable information about the contractor in
order to protect 3rd party economic interests.
allocated an annual budget of $1,096,348 for the contractor to do water
main repairs. But as of March 31, 2015 Benkovich spent $1,847,800. The
estimated budget was $407,983 which resulted in a deficit of $1,439,817.
did not utilize his own staff and internal city resources for water main
repairs. The annual allocation for his own staff was only $162,897.
Salary and benefits budgeted as of March 31, 2015, amount to
$53,593, however, a total of $62,192 was spent, which resulted in a
deficit of $8,599.
1: Internal staff and contractor payout for water main repairs not
Actual to March
Budget to March
for City Crew
analysis of these numbers, Benkovich allowed himself to run into deficit
for his own staff by only 16.04%, in comparison with his generous
willingness to enter into a deficit of 352.91% for the contractor. It has
been established that utilizing the City's own resources including its own
staff is the best option to reduce operational costs. Nevertheless, the
incompetent Benkovich, was unable to arrive at any contentious solution
with his own City employees and consequently, a large amount of tax
dollars were scammed and defrauded.
there is "no proportional increase of deficit between the
contractor and the internal staff allocation." This is a clear
indication that a scam is still continuing and also highlights the
presence of incompetence in managing a divisional business.
continually justifies his scam stating that aging infrastructure resulted
in the water main breaks. If
water main breaks are expected to increase than comparatively, Benkovich
should increase internal resources and strengthen its allocation. Rather
than finding a cost effective and efficient solution within the City,
Benkovich continually hires a private contractor.
has also attempted to justify his incompetence by blaming a decline in
water usage as a result of less revenue. If there are definite facts that
water usage is declining, the estimated forecast water usage should also
be declining. Benkovich, however, chooses to work opposite to the scenario
and, instead, estimated higher water usage every year in order to continue
his scam. This makes no sense,
and the discrepancy is evident. As a result, taxpayers are no longer
fooled by his incompetence.
2: Declining water usage unaccounted for in budget forecast to hide
incompetence and to defraud tax dollars
analysis of these facts, the 2014 revenue obtained form user fees declined
by 1.7%. This pattern also reflects previous years.
However when forecasting the 2015 budget, the incompetent,
Bankovich, estimated 5.09% more revenue when compared to 2014. This higher
revenue estimation does not reflect declining water usage. Benkovich
should plan the water budget considering the declining water usage.
Instead he forecasted a higher revenue in order to continue his scam. If
there is a “higher revenue forecast ” he can continue to allocate a
budget for external contractors to do the job at higher price.
Bigger administration is failing to address those issues and Benkovich
continues to utilize his old tactics and tax dollars scam. Additionally,
Benkovich utilizes his authoritarian style of management to hide his
incompetence in the division.
Bigger administration must take stern action against Benkovich and
surrounding corrupt bureaucrats in order to prevent further abuse and the
defrauding of public funds. There are other options available but
Benkovich must first and foremost, be kicked out from City hall to protect
Released on September 12, 2015 @ 21:00
initially published on Journal
of The Royal Society Interface,
11 (93), Brief review and
excerpts of the article follows.
the emergence of civil society
debate exists on how to best govern society and promote cooperation:
is cooperation best maintained by a central authority or is it better
handled by more decentralized forms of governance? The debate is still
unresolved, and identifying mechanisms that promote cooperation
remains one of the most difficult challenges facing society and
policymakers today. Decentralized, individual sanctioning of
non-cooperators (also known as free-riders or defectors) is one of the
main tools used by societies to promote and maintain cooperation.
Individuals can sanction free-riders implicitly via behavioural
reciprocity (as in the case of the highly successful tit-for-tat
strategy) or explicitly via costly punishment. Both of these forms of
peer punishment have been widely studied using evolutionary models and
behavioural experiments. Recently, however, researchers showed that
centralized institutions can have an evolutionary advantage over peer
punishment because, unlike peer-punishers, these institutions may
eliminate ‘second-order’ free-riding. Second-order free-riders
cooperate with other players but they do not pay the cost of punishing
defectors and this can allow defectors to re-emerge. To address this
problem, researchers present
a model of ‘pool’ punishment, where agents commit resources to a
centralized authority that sanctions free riders. Pool punishment
avoids the second-order free-rider problem because the centralized
authority punishes any individual who does not contribute to the
punishment pool (including cooperators and peer-punishers). This
allows pool-punishers to quickly take over a population, displacing
both free-riders and peer-punishers. These advantages help to explain
why human societies frequently delegate punishment to centralized
institutions. They also help to explain why centralized institutions
acquire an increasing monopoly over legitimate punishment over time by
stigmatizing and criminalizing various forms of peer punishment.
sanctioning institutions have been shown to emerge naturally through
social learning, displace all other forms of punishment and lead to
stable cooperation. However, this result provokes a number of
questions. If centralized sanctioning is so successful, then why do
many highly authoritarian states suffer from low levels of
cooperation? Why do states with high levels of public good provision
tend to rely more on citizen-driven peer punishment? Here, we consider
how corruption influences the evolution of cooperation and punishment.
Our model shows that the effectiveness of centralized punishment in
promoting cooperation breaks down when some actors in the model are
allowed to bribe centralized authorities. Counter intuitively, a
weaker centralized authority is actually more effective because it
allows peer punishment to restore cooperation in the presence of
corruption. Our results provide an evolutionary rationale for why
public goods provision rarely flourishes in polities that rely only on
strong centralized institutions. Instead, cooperation requires both
decentralized and centralized enforcement. These results help to
explain why citizen participation is a fundamental necessity for
policing the commons.
It is also possible
that institutions may further evolve to deal with this remaining
instability. Analytical results in the electronic supplementary
information show that when second-order punishment is strong, hybrid
punishers are only destabilized by neutral-drift towards
pool-punishers (who then allow corruptors and defectors to emerge).
Institutions may therefore want to screen and punish pure
pool-punishers; and it is interesting that many justice systems have
evolved rules that fine people who merely pay their taxes but do not
register for various forms of hybrid punishment, for example jury
duty. Importantly, however, we have shown that simply adding the risk
of corruption can help to explain why centralized and decentralized
forms of punishment frequently coexist. No additional appeal to civic
norms or civic culture is needed. Which is not to say that these
things do not exist or that they do not further promote citizen
participation in policing the commons. Rather, our model shows that
independent of other virtues, peer-punishment strategies can have a
fitness advantage over pool punishment alone. In the face of
corruption, peer and hybrid punishment strategies better promote
cooperation because they are competitive. If one punisher fails to
punish a corrupt individual, another might step in; and this result
may help to explain why polities who want to control corruption and
promote cooperation often become more tolerant to various forms of
drives the emergence of civil society
S, Sayed R, Rahwan I, LeVeck BL, Cebrian M, Rutherford A, Fowler JH.
(2014). Corruption drives the emergence of civil society. Journal
of The Royal Society Interface, 11 (93), 20131044.