Released on July 07, 2015 @ 13:00 EDT
Tag #: 680
Waking up to the price of
Departure cost taxpayers about $ 362,517.00. Fowke
brokered the deal
Nadorozny: Incompetent and lack of accountability
The service of the City
of Greater Sudbury’s former CAO, Doug Nadorozny's, was terminated and he
was escorted out from the City hall by the corporate security manager.
During the past regime,
Nadorozny coordinated with Canapini, the city solicitor, Fowke, human
resources director and Benkovich, director of water and wastewater
division. Together they utilized the police force to remove an employee
who spoke out against the defrauding of public funds from the Wahnapitate
water plant. Similarly and
ironically, Nadorozny was escorted out from the city hall without any
notification and thus paid this hefty price for his actions.
This is a clear warning
that defrauding public funds can no longer be tolerated. All bureaucrats
involved in corruption sooner or later will be removed from the City hall.
They no longer belong to the transparency and accountability of the
government which promises to protect civil rights.
Super CAO Doug Nadorozny
cost taxpayers almost quarter a million dollars annually. Nadorozny made
$223,374, plus $9,372 in benefits in 2014. Nadorozny's
salary had increased by about $10,000 since 2011, when it was $213,196.
According to Nadorozny's
leaked contract (See
contract), he is entitled to "buy back" OMERS pension plan
for missing service later in his job. The City agreed to pay 50% cost of
the purchase. His salary is subject to increase at 3.5% annually. He is
also entitled to $700 per month for the use of a personal vehicle at work,
and will be compensated for out- of-town business travel. Nodorozny is
also entitled to 8 weeks of vacation per calendar year. Additionally, the
City provided $ 1500 to review his contract by a lawyer of his choice.
According to Nadorozny's
employment contract, he is entitled to receive a minimum of a 14 month
severance package. Nodorozny started working with the City of Greater
Sudbury in 1999 and he held almost 16 years of service with the City.
According to Lior Samfiru, co-founder of Samfiru Tumarkin LLP (an online
severance package calculator), Nodorozny is entitled to 16-20 months
compensation. In addition, he earned almost a month of vacation
entitlement for 2016. This has to be paid out too. Therefore it is
estimated that Nodorozny is entitled to receive 19 months of pay as a
It can now be established
that Nodorozny received, as compensation, 19 months of wages which is
equal to $ 362, 517. Kevin Fowke, director of human resources, brokered
the deal with Nodorozny. This will also assure that Nodorozny will not
take any civil action against the City of Greater Sudbury.
According to the
Municipal Information and Protection of Privacy act, it is not allowed to
access labour relations information such as severance packages of
Nodorozny's departure and
his administration failures caused huge damages to the city and that
damage cannot be estimated. His activities came with unrecoverable cost to
the taxpayers. Furthermore, The City of Greater Sudbury’s image was
largely spoilt and finally the burden was passed on to the taxpayers.
Corrupted bureaucrats surrounded by Nadorozny were continuing to involve
themselves with other scandalous agendas. These such agendas include the
water main break repair contract, the water division after-hour monitoring
SCADA contract, external legal services contracts and the millions of tax
dollars that were defrauded.
Out of all of this,
however, it was the transit ticket scandal that immediately took the
spotlight in the eyes of the public. Nodorozny took every action available
to him in attempts to hide it. He was then hammered by social justice
groups that demanded for answers. Even his joint attempt with Jamie
Canapini, the City solicitor, along with all other desperate attempts to
hide evidence of the missing transit ticket money from the public, failed.
As such, during the election campaign, Bigger promised to disclose a
forensic report but he later discovered that such a report does not even
Paid news vs. Bureaucratic
According to the WikiLeaks Sudbury, an investigative team said there is no
forensic audit report. The WikiLeaks Sudbury therefore did not make any attempt to access them. Sudbury's
tabloid news paper, City hall editor, Darren MacDonald (of Northern Life),
however, submitted a freedom of information request to access the forensic
report. This is part of a campaign to white-wash the scandal surrounding
Nadorozny while providing misleading information to the public to convince
them that Nadorozny efficiently handled the matter.
Adding to the plot is the
fact that Northern Life's City hall reporter, MacDonald, is facing an
allegation that he is being paid by City hall bureaucrats to keep
everything under the radar.
The costs of corruption
for economic, political and social development are becoming increasingly
evident. Unfortunately, many of the most convincing arguments in support
of the fight against corruption are little known to the public and remain
unused in political debates. This brief account of evidence provides a
glimpse into the true cost and renders clear why governments and
businesses must prioritise the fight against corruption.
Corruption is defined as
the abuse of public or private office for personal gain. It includes acts
of bribery, embezzlement, nepotism or state capture. It is often
associated with and reinforced by other illegal practices, such as bid
rigging and fraud. Nadorozny's portfolio is henceforth a match for the
entire criterion and removal from office is the only option available to
Released on July 07, 2015 @ 13:00
This research initially
published on Japanese
International Economies (34), 272–290. Brief review and excerpts of the
pay vs. procedural inconvenience
This paper considers the
effects of employment protection (EP) on worker incentives in the labour
market with search friction, where EP is categorized into severance pay
(SP) and procedural inconvenience (PI). When organization cannot
distinguish shirkers, EP seems to negatively affect worker incentives,
because shirkers are unlikely to be fired. However, EP can have a positive
effect on worker incentives because diligent workers are protected by EP.
It is shown that the positive effect can dominate the negative one when EP
is moderate. In particular, PI tends to improve the unemployment rate and
welfare, while SP has a somewhat unclear effect.
This paper analyzed the
effects of SP and PI on worker incentives in the labour market with search
friction when all workers including shirkers are protected by EP. This
study has shown that the effect of PI on worker incentives is likely to be
positive compared with the effect of SP and that PI plays a significant
role in worker incentives. Specifically, (1) both SP and PI decrease
market tightness; that is, they induce vacancies to leave the market. (2)
While the effects of SP on the incentive compatible wage, the threshold of
dismissal, and welfare are ambiguous, SP tends to negatively affect the
unemployment rate. (3) PI is likely to decrease the incentive compatible
wage, the threshold of dismissal, and the unemployment rate, and it has a
positive effect on social welfare. (4) A hike of SP or PI does not
substantially affect the incentive compatible wage; however, this effect
mainly appears through the threshold of dismissal and market tightness.
(5) An increase in PI lowers the inflow to and outflow from unemployment.
Consistent with the
literature, the speed of this inflow and outflow is not significantly
associated with the unemployment rate. Accordingly, PI is more effective
than SP when worker incentives are crucial and every worker is protected
by EP; thus, it is important to provide sufficient notice and to negotiate
with unions. Although EP seems to negatively influence worker incentives
when shirkers are also protected, the conclusion of this study indicates
that this is not always the case. However, research does not imply that we
should have stringent EP. The main message is that EP, especially PI, can
positively influence worker incentives when it is moderate.
Some points of this study
may be controversial. First, we may need to consider search externalities.
Because social welfare may be associated with search externalities, this
positive effect on social welfare may be due to the elimination of
negative search externalities. Social welfare is affected through various
paths and by multiple factors in this model, and it is too difficult to
evaluate each path explicitly. Although estimating how search
externalities are associated with social welfare in this model is complex,
reseachers can infer the effect of the search externalities to some
In the literature review
book model wage bargaining but
with no incentive problem and no firing cost, the optimal level of
bargaining power is uniquely determined using the
different condition; that is, it is efficient when workers’
bargaining power is equivalent to the elasticity of matching. When the
bargaining power of workers is weak compared to the elasticity of
matching, as shown by the its condition, the unemployment rate is
excessively low from the perspective of efficiency.
In this case, social
welfare improves if a policy raises the unemployment rate. Research
established baseline with weak bargaining power of a worker. As the
bargaining power strengthens, social welfare initially improves until the
bargaining power exceeds the elasticity of matching, at which point it
Although this model with
the incentive problem and firing cost differs from the textbook model, the
effect of SP may be similar to that of workers’ bargaining power because
high SP can increase the basic wage. Actually, the numerical illustrations
show that the unemployment rate and the in the textbook model. If search
externalities are crucial only to social welfare in this model, the social
welfare should have an inverted U-shape with respect to SP showing that
social welfare first increases then decreases with respect to SP in the
case of z = 0. In contrast, as shown in another study social welfare
decreases as SP increases from 0. This implies that the improvement in
social welfare generated by PI is not caused only by the elimination of
search externalities. The effects of search externalities, therefore, are
not essential to the result of this study.
Next, this model assumes
that a random shock to productivity is repeated independently from the
identical distribution. Thus, we can avoid complexity of analysis.
However, as a vintage model suggests, the productivity of a match may
initially be high and then decrease. In this case, long term employment
relations become inefficient, and the positive effects of EP shown in this
study are alleviated. From the perspective of the vintage model, EP should
be more stringent in the beginning of matching but more moderate for a
long-term match. However, in contrast, we see that a long-term match may
be more productive because of workers’ skill formation and cooperative
industrial relationships, which are difficult to establish in a short
period. In this situation, EP may have a more positive effect.
Accordingly, the effects of EP hinge on productivity of matching which may
vary over time.
Although this viewpoint
is outside the scope of this paper, it is a crucial issue left for future
analysis, especially through empirical perspectives. Finally, we have not
considered the difference of wage-setting between wage posting and wage
bargaining. Between permanent employees and fixed-term ones in developed
countries, there are earnings and working condition gaps. The difference
of wage setting may be associated with this gap. A recent study by another
researcher shows that the proportion of matches under wage bargaining is
lower than the socially optimal level if no employment policy is
implemented. The study implies the need for analyzing the effects of EP
under each wage-setting, and that is another issue for future work.
pay vs. procedural inconvenience
K. (2014). Employment
protection and incentives: Severance pay vs. procedural inconvenience.
Japanese International Economies (34), 272–290.