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Better scrutiny leads to reduced corruption and stronger democracies in all society’s institutions, including government, corporations and other organizations.





     May 2018        
Released on May 07, 2018
Tag # 702

WikiLeaks Sudbury

Bigger… Politically Corrupt or Bankrupt, and both????

WikiLeaks Sudbury

When Bigger took municipal office, he promised to run an  accountable  and transparent  municipal administration. However, Bigger failed to eliminate corrupt officials from the City hall. They were strategically infiltrated into Bigger administration. He promoted and treated them with extraordinary packages. City’s incompetent administrators continually waste thousands of tax dollars. Bigger is failed to address important issues for the Sudbury taxpayers. Taxpayers are still on the hook with incompetent administrators. Gravy train is running across the City hall. WikiLeaks Sudbury release more information. Stay tuned...

Fowke’s puppet show: Waste of Tax dollars and corruption

Fowke: Incompetent and negligence

Fired: Benkovich is no more. Water gate scandal unfolding. 

Benkovich: Corrupt practices

Man who wasted thousands of tax dollars finally has gone from the City hall . He tried many times and took any possible chances to extend his contract. However, all of his attempts were unsuccessful. Benkovich has become a symbol of incompetence and waste of tax dollars. He contracted out water and wastewater emergency maintenance service and scammed millions of tax dollars. Initially, the contract was awarded for only $200,000.00, later on it was  increased to over $ 1.5 million. However, Benkovich made  sure to reimburse over $60,000 for his additional expenses from tax dollars. Stay tuned.. more information to follow.

Incompetent Fowke and Nepotism

Benkovich’s corrupt practices are not limited to extending underhand contract deals. In order to give  his son-in-law a post in the system, Benkovich fired one of the employees from Whanapitate Water plant. Under Fowke’s watch, Benkovich hired his son-in-law to fill the vacancy within 24 hours. Former director of human resources division, Kevin Fowke, now is City’s General Manager, failed to control these corrupt practices. Sudbury tax payers were doomed and their sons and daughters were not able to reach out any job opportunity in the City hall. Fowke created a family business in City hall and now infiltrated into the Bigger administration. His corrupt practices continue. 

Millions of dollars for Labour and employment external legal fees

Fowke is generous to give away millions of tax dollars as legal fees for labor and employment services.  Fowke’s department paid Sudbury based legal firm over 9 million dollars and Toronto based legal firm another over million dollars. Under his watch, labour and employment legal cost was sky rocketed. Large amount of tax dollars wasted. Every year, City has owned legal services department consumed over 1.5 million tax dollars which consists of expenses for lawyers and support staff.

Human Right Violations

Fowke faced allegations of human right violations and sexual harassment. At the Human Rights Tribunal hearing, Tribunal concluded that the employees at the water and wastewater division were unfairly treated. Then Fowke and his corrupt administrators took extra ordinary action and request to declare human right complainant as a vexatious litigant. However, the Tribunal dismissed his request. Fowke paid undisclosed amount to settle sexual harassment case against him. Ultimately all cost passed to the taxpayers.

Fowke: Symbol of incompetence

Fowke’s incompetence effected to all divisions of the City administration. The recent volunteer fire fighters issue and the involvement of the Ministry of Labour in the harassment complaints are the highlights to illustrate  his incompetence in managing the issues with the City hall. Rather than finding agreeable solutions between the two parties, Fowke was “generous” to spend thousands of tax dollars to hire  external legal services to do the job he was supposed to do. .  Fowke’s gravy train is running across the City hall.

Bigger’s Generous Package for Fowke

According to 2017 public salary disclosure, Fowke claimed from taxpayers  an annual salary of $194,746.90 while taxpayers are struggling to make ends meet.

Bigger’s administration has failed to address and control the issues in the City hall. The waste  of tax dollars is continued. Every time Fowke breaks a window, Bigger’s administration obediently sweeps up the broken glasses. Every time Bigger overtly defends his behavior, or implicitly excuses himself from failing to achieve the objects, they bind themselves to him more tightly.

Bigger’s administration must act to clean up the City hall, and Fowke and the corrupt administrators must be kicked out of the City hall.

Stay tuned... more information to follow.

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City’s Labour and Employment Legal Expenses Continually Soar
2011 outside legal counsel expenses paid to the one single firm reached $
Toronto based legal firm received $ 717,123.22 pay cheque - Disbursements also includes airfairs and hotel charges
City Clerk Hallsworth reimbursed $ 593.25 legal expenses from tax dollars - Echo of bad legal advice
City Spent $ 86,142.00 tax dollars to defend the misconduct of bureaucrats’ in Human Rights legal proceedings from 2009 to 2012. 
Transit Ticket Scandal: Nadorozny’s Sorry Saga -CAO Nadorozny, City Solicitor Canapini and Director Human Resources, Fowke should step down    
City’s labour and employment legal expenses on the rise - Incompetence of top bureaucrat in the human resources division exposed
Authoritarianism: City in crisis
Lack of Accountability: "Gravy train" all over again
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Released on May 07, 2018

This article originally published on Crime, Law & Social Change 38: 1–32, 2002    Brief overview and excerpts of the articles as follows:

Explaining corruption: An institutional choice approach

Social rules provide the mechanisms that allow the linkage to external and internal worlds. To constructivists, social institutions are individual rules, or sets of rules, established in consonance with material realities. Theoretical explanations emerge from the analysis of the interaction of rules, agents, and material conditions. Constructivists analyze how these interactions constitute or cause individual behavior by providing agents with direction and incentives for action, and how these interactions influence changes to institutions (rules). Onuf’s theory of rules is the foundation of the constructivist analytic frame. Rules tell people what they should do, what they must do, and what they have a right to do. When agents fail to follow rules, other supporting rules bring consequences. Considering their material circumstances, agents follow or disregard rules to achieve their goals. Institutions or regimes are simply patterns of stable rules, while structure is a stable pattern of rules, institutions, and their unintended consequences.

Complex institutions, like corruption, consist of a constantly changing mix of three different types of social rules that perform distinct functions.  First, instruction rules delineate the principles, beliefs, or norms that inform agents of the institution’s purposes. Instruction rules tell agents what they should do. Second, directive rules provide specificity to the instruction-ruled principles, beliefs and norms. Directive rules support instruction rules by telling agents what they must do. In order for directive rules to be effective, they must be supported by other rules (sanctions) that stipulate the consequences if an agent does not follow a particular directive rule. Third, commitment rules create roles for agents. Commitment rules tell agents what they have a right or duty to do. Commitment rules give some agents well-defined powers, while assuring other agents that those powers will not be abused. How well the three types of rules perform their assigned function depends upon their formality and strength. A rule’s formality concerns how well the rule is supported by other rules. A rule’s strength is determined by how frequently agents follow the rule.

The mix of the three different types of rules results in three distinct forms of rule, or methods that govern society. While all three types of rules exist in every society, those societies with a higher proportion of instruction rules are ruled by hegemony. The concept of hegemony used here closely follows the analysis of Gramsci who argues that a ruling class must persuade other classes in society to accept its moral, political, and cultural values, thus making the phenomena of culture and ideology central to the ruling system.

Hegemony refers to the promulgation and manipulation of principles and instructions by which superordinate powers monopolize meaning which is then passively absorbed by the subordinate actors. These activities constitute a stable arrangement of rule because the ruled are rendered incapable of comprehending their subordinate role. They cannot formulate alternative programs of action because they are inculcated with the self-serving ideology of the rulers who monopolize the production and dissemination of statements through which meaning is constituted.

Finally, societies with a higher proportion of commitment rules are ruled by heteronomy. This term is traced to Kant who referred to heteronomy as a condition of not having autonomy.  Heteronomy defines a condition where rational decision-makers are never fully autonomous, and whose decisions toward particular ends are bounded both by societal rules and their material means. Formal commitment rules stipulate promises by some agents, promises that become the rights (i.e., promises kept) of other agents. Ruling elite in societies with strong commitment rules find their autonomy severely restricted.  The emergence of commitment rules is often the unintended consequences of the strengthening (widespread societal following) of instruction and directive rules. Using the above constructivist theory of rules in conjunction with the  institutional choice analytic frame, this paper develops a middle range theory of the causes of corruption.  Researchers concentrate in the middle, between aggregate macro- and detailed micro-concepts, looking for sets of grouped social rules closely associated with the corruption concept. I construct a set of coordinates of socially constructed phenomena (sets of rules) that explain the range of corrupt behavior and the recurrence of consistent patterns of corruption. The resultant interdisciplinary theory applies across the centuries and to differing political and economic systems.

A central theme of this institutional choice analysis is the critical need to generate anti-corruption commitment rules. Without directive rule reform of authoritarian political power structures, the emergence of stronger anticorruption commitment rules in most states is unlikely. Moreover, without reforms to collectivist political cultures, it may be all but impossible to generate anti-corruption commitment rules. A state’s inability to generate commitment rules is the principal reason it is so difficult to arrest endemic corruption. My analysis shows that there are a variety of socially constructed phenomenon that lead to commitment rule construction. Among these phenomena, an empowered civil society playing a vital role in elite accountability emerges as the foundation to building commitment rules.

WikiLeaks Sudbury
May 2018

Michaelw, Collier (2002). Explaining corruption: An institutional choice approach, Crime, Law & Social Change 38: 1–32.

Related documents

Explaining corruption: An institutional choice approach


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