Fowke: Incompetent  and negligence	Posted on April 27, 2015 at 10:00 AM Fowke removed from acting CAO Kevin Fowke, Director of Human Resources, bureaucrat who siphoned-out millions of tax dollars from city coffers using labour and employment external legal service contracts removed from City's acting CAO position. The CEO of Greater Sudbury Airport, Bob Johnston appointed  as Greater Sudbury's interim chief administrative officer from May 4, 2015. Search for new CAO continues.
	Nadorozny: Incompetent and lack of accountability	Posted on April 15, 2015 @ 8:30 EDT City CAO Nadorozny no more (Fired) Escorted out from Tom Davies Square - City hall

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Released on April 05, 2015 at 17:30 
Tag #: 679

Nepotism: Bureaucratic disorder 



Documents leaked from Human Resources division


(from left)
Khoraych: City's cover up lawyer, Benkovich: Incompetent and controversial practices, Fowke: Incompetent and negligence

Khoraych behind Sudbury legal fees scam: Report
Benkovich and Fowke also behind the scheme

There are mounting concerns over unwarranted legal expenses within the Human Resources division, where charges like nepotism, cronyism and fraud undermine the integrity and accountability of the spending of tax dollars. According to the leaked documents, the value of tax dollars is "undermined"   by management practices that do not adequately adhere to the guiding values of fairness, access, transparency and representativeness.

The City of Greater Sudbury bureaucrats continually hired private lawyers instead of utilizing their internal legal staff. The legal service department consists of 4 lawyers and 11 staff members and costs taxpayers 1.2 million dollars annually.  

According to the leaked documents from Human Resources and Organizational Development division, Nick Benkovich, Director of water and wastewater Services, and Kevin Fowke, of the Human Resources and Organizational Development, continually hired the same lawyer Mireille Khoraych, outsourced from the same Toronto-based legal firm. The leaked document states: "Benkovcih and Fowke entitled to counsel of their choice, and that counsel has always been Ms. Khoraych".

This clearly indicates that certain groups of individuals and legal firms are benefitting from the legal fees scam. During the 2014 year alone, the City spent $417,00.00 tax dollars on seeking legal advising from external lawyers. The issue of nepotism has reached an alarming level and the human resources and legal services divisions are both failing to address any issues in the best interest of taxpayers.  They continually utilized public funds for their own personal interest and even to cover up their wrong doings.  The taxpayers have been scammed and a large amount of tax dollars have been wasted.

In order to protect third party economic interests, WikiLeaks Sudbury will not disclose any identifiable information concerning the Toronto based legal firm.

In the public sphere, favoritism, cronyism, and nepotism also undermine the common good.   Favoritism is often covert and undercuts the transparency that should be a key part of municipal governmental operations. Despite this common sense value in moral, the City’s bureaucrats have created their own dynasty utilizing tax dollars. Furthermore, this leaked document clearly displays evidence that Fowke and Benkovich are foolish enough to show the public their under-hand deals, which were in reality a cost to the tax payers. Benkovich's and Fowke's activities—defrauding public funds, are now exposed and as such these bureaucrats should provide taxpayers with answers.

The new political leadership in the City of Greater Sudbury must take action against those corrupted bureaucrats before it is too late.

Leaked document
Benkovcih and Fowke entitled to counsel of their choice, and that counsel has always been Ms. Khoraych". 

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Editorial
Released on April 05, 2014 at 17:30 EDT

This research paper initially published on Law and Social Inquiry, 39 (1), 62-65. Brief overview and excerpts from the article as follows. 

Funding the Cause: How Public Interest Law Organizations Fund their Activities and why it Matters for Social Change

Public interest law organizations (PILOs) are unusual in that most of their work does not make money. They often represent clients who cannot afford private counsel. They take on expensive systemic reform cases with potentially far-reaching effects, but little chance for financial gain. They engage in non-revenue-generating activities that private lawyers seldom do, including community outreach and education, talking with the media, organizing coalitions, participating in demonstrations, providing advice and assistance to help individuals resolve their legal disputes, and training law students. Although these activities are essential to the law reform and social change goals of these organizations, they do not resemble the business-like model of modern private law offices.

Theories explaining the development of the field of public interest law vary. Some comparative studies seem to assume that the public interest field simply evolved naturally, its changing nature the product of maturation over time within expanding welfare state societies . A less descriptive view is that the expansion of public interest law, particularly of legal aid for the poor, served the interests of both the legal profession and societies based on capitalist economies. States, it was argued, could mollify the working class and poor by granting a range of welfare rights; at the same time, the legal profession could avoid undertaking the massive pro bono efforts that might otherwise be necessary to legitimate and sustain the legal system. Other explanations focus on how political forces have shaped the field of public interest law, allowing expansion during progressive times and forcing contraction and retrenchment with conservative shifts in the political climate.   

Neo-institutionalist organizational theories offer another possible interpretation: multiple PILO prototypes consolidated into one or two organizational forms as advocates followed the lead of successful organizations, Legal Defense Fund. As PILOs became taken for granted strategies for pursuing social change, perhaps new organizations mimicked the form of successful older organizations. Through this mimetic iso-morphism, a uniform organizational design may have diffused across practice areas and political orientations.  Similar legal and political environments also may have produced commonalities among PILOs. To the extent that PILOs respond to common requirements imposed by funders as well as government rules for nonprofits, coercive isomorphism may contribute to structural uniformity among PILOs despite their diverse missions. Indeed, research suggests that PILOs with similar forms now span political orientation and practice area boundaries.  

These theories suggest an answer to the puzzling question of why lawyers, foundations, and the public would support public interest law financially. They help explain why welfare states might fund legal representation as a poverty benefit, why legal professionals might donate their time and money to organizations that could be viewed as competitors, and how organizations might come to adopt similar funding structures across strikingly diverse subject areas and ideological lines. What they do not tell us, however, is how funding strategies might generate variation among PILOs, shape PILOs' strategies for social change, and affect their independence from political interference and attack.

The primary objections to pro bono representation, at least as a replacement for public interest organizations, are that private lawyers lack poverty experience, private lawyers may refuse to take certain cases due to (perceived) positional conflicts with their paying clients, and that diffuse private representation undermines the ability to seek systemic reform. Of course, pro bono representation avoids the restrictions on advocacy and political vulnerability that go along with government funding. Neverthelss, pro bono representation may trade political constraints for economic constraints: firm commitments to pro bono representation may waiver when the demand from paying clients for their lawyers' services is strong enough to absorb their lawyers' available time. In addition, empirical evidence suggests pro bono efforts respond to market forces in more subtle ways, expanding when the profession perceives that its jurisdictional control over legal services is under siege, and contracting when control over the provision of legal services seems secure. These dynamics do not necessarily track fluctuations in the need for pro bono representation.

Another alternative would be to increase foundation and private support for public interest organizations, which again would avoid the restrictions and political vulnerability that come with government funding. Not all causes are easy to sell to the foundation or private giving market, however. In addition, foundation support brings a subtle coercion of its own: to the extent that foundations develop their own funding priorities, then seek worthy programs to fund, public interest organizations may find themselves adjusting their agendas to chase resources, giving up their autonomy over defining their priorities. To alleviate this concern, progressive foundations might take a page from the conservative foundation playbook and devote more resources to general operating support, rather than start-up funds for individual, targeted programs. To be sure, not every organization that relies on foundation or private support will be co-opted by the interests of its benefactors. When organizations have diverse sources of support, and missions that closely track those of their foundation supporters, they will be less likely to be drawn away from their initial goals.   

Editor
WikiLeaks Sudbury
April 05, 2015