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     January  2015        

Conspiracy defeated:  Ontario Ombudsman Back in Sudbury

Conspiracy defeated:  Ontario Ombudsman Back in Sudbury

The City of Greater Sudbury has elected their closed door meeting investigator. There was an overwhelming support to reinstate Ontario Ombudsman Andre Marin, the provincial investigator. 

The City’s corrupted bureaucrats fired the Ontario Ombudsman and appointed their “YES” investigator, Amberley Gavel. Amberley Gavel produced a few reports and one of the reports cost tax payers over $6,000.00 dollars. Additionally, these bureaucrats hired a consultant to obtain the best option for a recruit for the City’s closed door investigator position.  It cost another $11,000.00.

The Ombudsman publicly criticized Amberley Gavel and stated that “Either Amberley Gavel is incompetent, they’re willfully blind or they didn’t want to bite the hand that feeds them, their report is a poor product. It’s poor.”

City Solicitor Jamie Canapini is leading corrupted bureaucrats in their conspiracy to fire the popular public figure, the Ontario Ombudsman. Their main objective is to continue City business under a veil of secrecy. All of their efforts have now been exposed and defeated. Recently, Ontario Ombudsman, Andre Marin publicly stated that Canapini had given former City Councillors “bad legal advice”, and said that Sudbury’s solicitor had launched an unsuccessful complaint about him to the Law Society of Upper Canada.

Ontario Ombudsman, Andre Marin will have jurisdiction in Sudbury until at least Nov. 30, 2018.  


Released on January 15, 2015 at 11:30 AM
Tag # : 676

Crisis Ahead: Benkovich continually misleads taxpayers 

Beware: Benkovich, the wounded animal

Benkovich: Incompetent and Controversial practices

Dog and Pony show: Benkovich’s bid to raise Water and Wastewater bill, defeated

Benkovich’s attempts at justifying a Water and Wastewater rate increase, on the basis of displaying broken pipes collected from the previous water main breaks, failed. Their plan has been defeated and the council ordered Benkovich to find savings. An example where savings could have occurred can be seen in the water main repairs which were outsourced rather than utilizing internal resources. As a result, Sudbury tax payers lost millions of dollars from this contract. According to the verified information available to WikiLeaks Sudbury  the contractor was allowed to charge a higher amount for material and labour. Consequently, what should have been a smaller cost for a mere water main repair, in the end, culminated to more than $50,000.00. City’s bureaucrats mutually benefited from the kickback programs and always willingly outsourced the City’s core services. A big example of such is the SCADA after hour monitoring service contract that Benkovich outsourced, undeterred by its $ 5,910.40 cost per hour to taxpayers.

Benkovich continually misleads taxpayers 

City’s Water and Wastewater director Nick Benkovich participated in the “Podium” conducted by Eastlink TV. As usual, Benkovich attempted to provide misleading information to the public. In order to support his cost saving claim - during his presentation- Benkovich stated that the Water and Wastewater plants were managed by a “one individual.”  These claims are misleading and are a manipulation of the real facts.

An Overall Responsible Officer (ORO) as well as operator standby for each section are employed all of the time. Additionally, an industrial mechanic, an electrician and a SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) technician are allocated and ready to respond around the clock. This means that at any given time, a minimum of nine (9) staff members are looking after the Water and Wastewater operation of the City of Greater Sudbury.  Nevertheless, Benkovich provided misleading facts on his podium program.  Benkovich’s claims of a “one individual” allocation to manage the Water and Wastewater operation, is therefore totally misleading and inaccurate.

The Union, CUPE 4705 ratified agreements with the City clearly reflect how many individuals are in fact working on any given time for Water and Wastewater operations.  Benkovich’s prime excuse for Water and Wastewater rate increases based on water main breaks, is henceforth beyond ridiculous, as it is clearly his method of management that is the true culprit of any monetary deficit within this department. His authoritarian management style has cost taxpayers millions of dollars, and instead of admitting to his mistakes he lies to the public about the nature of the department’s spending and suggests to, in effect, make the public pay for it. All this, even though he has already, unbeknownst to them, used their money to make his “mistakes” in the first place. This is significant in that it demonstrates there is no remorse on his behalf in terms of his misuse of public funds. It also further outlines his pattern of misuse and mistreatment of the public and its collective funds.

Benkovich has nearly exhausted the City’s resources to defend his actions along with support from Kevin Fowke, Director of Human Resources.  As it stands, the City has thus paid an extraordinary amount of legal fees and settlement fees. Furthermore, Benkovich also utilized public funds to pay his legal fees for personal dispute. This abusive and disrespectful behaviour of spending unwarrented tax dollars must end and Benkovich must step down immediately. It is clearly necessary to reform the Water and Waste Water division to establish value of the tax dollars.

On top of all of this, and as if any more proof is needed to determine Benkovich’s incompetence in his position, he has also faced over 400 grievances and 10 human rights complaints. Another allegation that Benkovich is facing is one of sexual misconduct and sexual harassment. Benkovich’s behaviour has been an open secret, going back years yet no one has taken any action. In fact, the human resources division made every effort to paint Benkovich in a positive light.

Again, it is clearly necessary to reform the Water and Wastewater division to establish value of the tax dollars. The entire Water and Wastewater operation and governing systems of this division have been taken over by one man - Benkovich.  He has ruined this City that is now engulfed in corruption and blatant abuse of power. Benkovich must step down immediately for the sake of this city and for halting the wasting of any more tax dollars.

Related Articles

Double Crisis in City’s Water and Wastewater Division
Divisional director facing allegations of human rights violations and abuse of power
Large amount of tax dollars wasted for legal fees to cover divisional director’s misconduct
City’s Labour and Employment Legal Expenses Continually Soar
2011 outside legal counsel expenses paid to the one single firm reached $
Toronto based legal firm received $ 717,123.22 pay cheque - Disbursements also includes airfairs and hotel charges
An outrageous spending practice found for Labour and Employment matters
City Spent $ 86,142.00 tax dollars to defend the misconduct of bureaucrats’ in Human Rights legal proceedings from 2009 to 2012. 
City’s labour and employment legal expenses on the rise - Incompetence of top bureaucrat in the human resources division exposed
Authoritarianism: City in crisis
Lack of Accountability: "Gravy train" all over again
Open and Transparent Municipal Government - Municipal Election Forcing New Politics of Sudbury Identity




Released on January 15, 2015 at 11:30 AM EDT

This article initially published on European Journal of Political Economy (35): 127. Excerpts and brief review of the article as follows. 

Corruption in delegated public procurement auctions

In this paper we theoretically analyse effects of corruption in public procurements within a scoring-auction framework. A corrupt administrators who acts on behalf of the public sector, receives a kickback from the winning bidder. The administrators select the scoring rule. The paper shows that such corruption always leads to lower quality and lower price.
Given a level of corruption, a higher bargaining power of the administrators in extracting bribes does not affect the quality but leads to higher price.

In the modern world Government contracts are typically awarded by procurement auctions, which are also often used by firms subcontracting work or buying services and raw materials. Clearly public procurements constitute a significant part of the economic activities in many countries.  The theory of auction provides the necessary analytical framework to study such procurements. However, it may be noted that the benchmark model of auctions is really a price-only auction where all other characteristics of provision are assumed to be identical for all potential vendors. Thus, in the traditional theory of standard procurement auctions (where the auctioneer is the buyer), the auctioneer cares only about the price of the object, but not the other attributes. However, in many procurement situations, the buyer cares about attributes other than price when evaluating the offers submitted by suppliers.  Non-monetary attributes that buyers care about include quality — sometimes along several observable/verifiable dimensions and time to completion. For example, in the contract for the construction of a new aircraft, the specification of its airworthiness and other characteristics is probably as important as its price. Under these circumstances, auctions are usually multidimensional. The essential element of such multi-dimensional auctions is a scoring rule. In the scoring auction, bidders are asked to submit multidimensional bids that include price and some non-price attributes, such as quality. The bids are then transformed into a score by an ex ante publicly announced scoring rule, and the bidder whose score is the highest is awarded the contract. There are many real life examples of such scoring auctions.

For example, the Department of Defence in the USA often relies on competitive source selection to procure weapon systems. Each individual component of a bid of the weapon system is evaluated and assigned a score, these scores are summed to yield a total score, and the firm achieving the highest score wins the contract. Many state departments of transportation in the US use “A + B bidding” for highway construction work in the United States, where the highway procurement authorities evaluate offers on the basis of their costs as well as time to completion, weighted by a road user cost. A similar mechanism is used in auctions for electricity reserve supply.  Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation in Japan allocates most of the public construction project contracts through scoring auctions based on quality-over-price ratio rules.

Researchers in their model both the quality and the bidder's types are single dimensional, types are identically and independently distributed and the scoring rule is quasi linear. Researchers also analyses the properties of optimal mechanisms when types are single-dimensional but correlated. Researchers analyses the case when both quality and types are multidimensional and the scoring rule is quasi linear and analyses optimal mechanisms with one-dimensional quality and two-dimensional discrete types. Further computes optimal mechanisms with multidimensional quality and single-dimensional types that are identically and independently distributed. Delegation, or empowering one to act on behalf of another, is pervasive in the modern firm. Shareholders delegate strategic decisions to managers; delegation is efficient when managers allocate resources, including their own efforts, in ways that do not divert from owners' objectives. However, that separation in decision making also gives rise to conflicts among the actors involved. A rather impressive body of work has developed on related topics, including agency theory  organizational controls systems, organizational structure, strategic leadership, strategic commitment theory and the role of irreversibility in competitive interaction.  Apart from the above mentioned papers two recent contributions deserve mention. In an experimental study researchers examines some aspects of delegating decision rights for future rewards as an alternative to corruption.

The study finds that even the pure anticipation of future rewards from a lobbying party suffices to bias a decision-maker in favour of this party, even though it creates negative externalities to others. In a rent-seeking model, examines the relationship between political corruption and the composition of public spending. It may be noted that the impact of corruption on procurement auctions may be huge in terms of efficacy of the project and thus merits discussion. Surprisingly, none of the papers in the literature on scoring auction has touched upon this aspect. As such, we endeavour to fill up this gap in the literature.

The literature so far has not dealt with the case where a corrupt, politically appointed government representative acts on behalf of the government agency and chooses the rules of the scoring auction. This situation is quite common in many countries.

For example, in local economies like municipalities, large infrastructure projects (roads, airports) are often commissioned by public sector organisations. The contracts for such projects are typically awarded through an auction and often some form of scoring auction is used. The public sector is typically controlled by its administrators, who act as public representatives and thus often have substantial say in this procurement process. Consequently, they have significant influence on the design of the scoring rules also. Problem arises when a public sector is saddled with a administrators who is not honest. A typical corrupt administrator receives a bribe from the winning bidder. In short, the administrator has the power to act on behalf of the public sector and he decides on the rules of the auction. In particular, he/she has a say in the selection of the scoring rule to be used, which need not reflect the true utility of the public sector or representative voter of the region. The scoring rule so selected is geared towards increasing the utility of the corrupt administrator.

WikiLeaks Sudbury
January 2015

Related Articles
Corruption in delegated public procurement auctions

Krishnendu, K.G.; Mukherjee, D. (2014). Corruption in delegated public procurement auctions
European Journal of Political Economy, (35), 122–127.



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