Released
- October 01, 2012 at 2:00 AM EDT
Tag#: 632
An
outrageous spending practice found for Labour and Employment matters
Uncovered 196 transactions belonging to 23 accounts
On April 9th 2008 the City
Council approved proposals for outside legal services. The report stated:
“This report has been reviewed by the Finance Division and the funding
source has been identified. The awarding of these contracts has been
provided for and is within the limits set in the 2008 budget.”
The report suggested that $897,862 over the three year period, or an
average of $299,288 per annum was anticipated to be spent by these Legal
Services, which is within the Legal Services annual budget allocation of
$344,000 for external legal counsel.
Costs for labour and employment law over the same three year period were
anticipated to be no more than $455,597 or $151,865 annually. Human
Resources and Organizational Development had an annual budget allocation
of $151,865 for external legal counsel.
The City hired “Catalyst
Consultants” to evaluate the suitability of the bidders and they were
then ranked accordingly. The 5 major areas were identified and 3 year
contracts were awarded.
Areas:
(1)
Provincial Offences Court/Prosecutions
(2)
Labour and Employment
(3)
Ontario Municipal Board Planning matters
(4)
Construction Contract and Lien matters
(5) General Litigation and
Municipal work
According to the report, the Labour and Employment contract was given to
two legal firms to specifically deal with the matters of Human Resources
and Organizational Development.
Karen
Matthies, the relief Director of Human Resources and Organizational
Development was also called in to assist in the evaluation. The evaluation
teams agreed that it would be appropriate to split the labour and
employment work between two firms, both of whom were ranked highly. They
will be referred to as Legal firm “A” and Legal Firm “B”. Legal
Firm “A” was to receive approximately 30 to 50 percent of the work and
Legal Firm “B” was to receive approximately 50 to 70 percent of the
work. The selection committee felt that this would be the most efficient
way of proceeding, and to rely upon the greatest strengths of both firms.
To
protect the economic interest of the third party,
WikiLeaks Sudbury will not disclose the name of the legal firm.
One of the legal firms
qualified to provide legal counsel for Labour and Employment matters
received
$
7,736,649.38
for
the 3 year period of 2008, 2009 and 2010 for the services provided to the
City.
2008
- Payments:
$ 1,357,541.85
2009 - Payments: $ 4,492,678.91
2010
- Payments: $ 1,886,428.62
Over this 3 year
period, no more than $455,597 should have been spent by the Labour and
Employment matters. On average, $151,865 would have been the maximum
annual allocation for this category. However these amounts seem to have
been exceeded enormously. It remains a real puzzle to clearly identify for
the taxpayers where and why the apparent over spending has occurred.
Further investigation is needed.
We have uncovered 196 transactions belonging to 23 accounts.
The City of Greater
Sudbury Tax payers have the right to know how their tax dollars were spent
for labour and employment matters. Tax payers also have the right to know
how legal firms dealing with labour and employment matters were eligible
to receive these apparent over payment for their work. This clarification
is necessary for transparency and accountability to the public.
Some of the invoices were
marked as invoiced and accounted for on the same day. For example with
account #: 69238, an invoice valued at $ 2,022,200.00 was billed on August 20,
2009 and the “accounting date” was marked for that same day.
For complete transparency
the public has the right to know exactly what the purpose was for setting
up this specific account # 69238.
If account # 69238 is set
up to cover only legal advice on labour and employment matters by a single
firm that shall remain unnamed at this time, then there should be a limit
to these expenses of no more than $455,597 for 3 years or an average
$151,865 per year. Yet it is troubling the actual payment on account #
69238 over the 3 year period is
$ 5,448,600.00
The
public has the right to ask Kevin Fowke, the director of human resources and
organizational development with the City, to responsibly identify the
details of these expenses.
What follows below are
supporting documentation that outline some of the concern above.
Categorization
by year:
2008 - Payments: Click
here for more information
2009 - Payments: Click
here for more information
2010 - Payments: Click
here for more information
Payments
Categorization by accounts
for 3 years
2008,
2009, 2010
Summary
- Click here for more
information
Categorization
by individual accounts:
Related documents:
Request
for proposal approved by Council
------------------------End.
Editorial:
Released on October 01, 2012 at 2:00 AM EDT
The
original article initially published on Journal
of Canadian Studies 46 (1), 112-137, 254-255.
Excerpts from the article as follows.
Agenda Setting, Policy Learning, Organizational Legacies, Path Dependency,
and Beyond
In 2006,
the Ontario government amended the Ontario Municipal Act by passing Bill
130, the Municipal Statute Law Amendment Act. Among other things, this
legislation required that municipalities adopt a number of mandatory
provisions relating to accountability and transparency. Local governments
were also asked to consider a number of voluntary measures. This editorial
examines how 12 municipal governments in Ontario responded to these
mandatory and voluntary legislative requirements. Using primary documents
and elite interviews with local government officials, the contributors
analyzed the municipal processes and outcomes produced in response to Bill
130. The findings suggest that, in general, Ontario municipalities tended
to react negatively to the mandatory and optional policy changes
instituted from above. None the less, there was some variation in
municipal responses, much of which can be explained by focussing on
variations in municipal policy learning, organizational legacies, public
input, and to a lesser extent, time and cost restraints.
Although
the existing local government literature is rich with descriptions of the
provincial-municipal relationship as it pertains to the delivery of
programs, fiscal relations, and municipal amalgamation, very little is
known about how local governments respond to voluntary and mandatory
policy change from above. To partially address these lacunae, we examine
the 2006 implementation of Ontario's Bill 130, which saw the provincial
government require municipalities to pass accountability and transparency
regimes that had both mandatory and voluntary elements. This Ontario
legislation emerged from a number of high-profile scandals in Ontario
involving MFP Financial, which were reported in the news in the early
2000s. These scandals highlighted what were perceived to be significant
deficiencies in local accountability and transparency regimes in the
province. In response, the Ontario government amended the Municipal Act in
2006 to force municipalities to design better accountability and
transparency regimes. First, municipal governments were required to create
and/or update formal accountability and transparency policies in a number
of areas and to create a process for investigating closed, in-camera
sessions and meetings. Second, local governments were asked to consider a
number of optional accountability and transparency measures, such as a
code of conduct, a lobbyist registry/registrar, an auditor-general, and an
integrity commissioner.
Our
analysis relied on a variety of primary documents, such as minutes to
various meetings, research reports, and other items in each of the
municipalities. We also conducted 14
anonymous interviews with city
officials who were involved in the creation of their city's
accountability and transparency policies. These interviews took place in
the spring and summer of 2010 and were conducted over the phone. Each
of the interviewees was given the option to remain anonymous, and each
exercised that option.
Our
findings suggest that most, but not all, municipalities chose to meet the
minimum requirements, while the optional measures were adopted unevenly
across our sample. Those that pursued more than the minimum requirements
tended to be larger municipalities or had existing policies that were
similar to the voluntary ones listed in the legislation. At first glance,
these findings may reflect the fact that municipal actors generally are
resistant to any provincial "interference" in local
decision-making; yet our research suggests that other factors, such as
organizational legacies, policy learning, public demand, and to a lesser
extent, time and cost restraints, may also matter for determining
municipal responses to provincially mandated policy change.
The
municipal accountability and transparency legislation introduced in 2006
was driven by a number of factors related to a perception that municipal
politics in Ontario lacked openness. A key factor behind this perception
was a series of headlining scandals that had cost some municipalities tens
of millions of dollars. At the centre of these scandals was MFP Financial,
which in the past had provided a variety of technical services to a number
of municipalities in Ontario. The most notable of MFP's financial dealings
was with the City of Toronto, which commentators argue did not receive the
kind of scrutiny it deserved. Among other things, incentives were given to
municipal officials and councillors in return for favourable treatment of
MFP's financial proposals. The result was millions of dollars in cost
overruns.
These
specific scandals reinforced pre-existing negative perceptions of
municipal transparency, such as those related to the close relationship
between certain special interests and municipal officials, Some
recent research on Canadian local election financing MacDermid 2006, 2007;
Young and Austin for
instance, has found a high correlation between private support-most
notably from the development industry-and electoral success. As a result,
many urban centres tend to have councils with a pro-development bias.
Structurally,
with respect to access to information requests, municipalities have also
traditionally been much slower at producing requested information. They
have been criticized for the exorbitant costs of some access requests.
Typically, an access to information request at the federal level of
government costs only five dollars, which can be seen as a negligible
administrative charge. Municipalities will often charge for any copying
and other such expenses, however. If a request produces dozens of pages of
information that require photocopying, the cost can be quite prohibitive.
This ultimately produces a barrier to trying to access information at the
municipal level.
In
short, a convergence of structural and temporal factors created the
conditions for the Ontario government to pursue accountability and
transparency reform at the local level in 2006. The primary legislation
that governs provincial- municipal relations in Ontario is the Municipal
Act. As a general ordinance, the act applies to all municipalities in the
province regardless of size (except for Toronto), provides the legal
foundation for the creation of municipalities, and outlines what
municipalities can and cannot do in terms of the programs and services
they can create. The act also provides the guidelines for municipal public
administration and therefore is the centrepiece for local accountability
and transparency policies.
Reference:
Alcantara et al.,(2012).
Responding
to Policy Change from Above: Municipal Accountability and Transparency
Regimes in Ontario. Journal
of Canadian Studies 46 (1), 112-137, 254-255
Editor
WikiLeaks
Sudbury
October
01, 2012
Related
Documents
Responding
to Policy Change from Above: Municipal Accountability and Transparency
Regimes in Ontario
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