|Posted on April 27, 2015 at 10:00 AM
Fowke removed from acting CAO
Kevin Fowke, Director
of Human Resources, bureaucrat who siphoned-out millions of tax
dollars from city coffers using labour and employment external legal service contracts
removed from City's acting CAO position. The CEO of Greater
Sudbury Airport, Bob Johnston appointed as
Greater Sudbury's interim chief administrative officer from May 4,
2015. Search for new CAO continues.
Nadorozny: Incompetent and lack of
|Posted on April 15, 2015 @ 8:30
City CAO Nadorozny no more (Fired)
Escorted out from Tom Davies Square - City hall
Emergency water main break repair
Nick Benkovich, Director of Water and Wastewater Services,
outsourced repairs of water main breaks.
In 2006, the contract was initially awarded an annual amount
of $250,000 and ended up with an annual average of $1.6 million.
Later, without any competitive bidding or tender process, the
contract was extended for another term. This time (2011), however,
the contract was awarded an annual amount of $750,000 but ended with
an annual average of $2.8 million. The City continually denied
access to the expense details and attempted to permanently burry the
scandal. This matter is now at the inquiry stage before the
Information and Privacy Commissioner's office. This time, Benkovich
used extraordinary action to prevent access to the information.
Benkovich seems to have hired a lawyer at the expense of a
contractor in order to attempt to secure the hiding of the
information on behalf of the contractor and objected to release the
information to the public. This attempt has been successfully
defeated. Now the matter has rebounded to the inquiry stage.
Wikileaks Sudbury will release more information to the public soon
after they are available.
Released on April 05, 2015 at 17:30
Tag #: 679
leaked from Human Resources division
City's cover up lawyer, Benkovich: Incompetent and controversial
practices, Fowke: Incompetent and negligence
behind Sudbury legal fees scam: Report
Benkovich and Fowke also behind the scheme
There are mounting
concerns over unwarranted legal expenses within the Human Resources
division, where charges like nepotism, cronyism and fraud undermine the
integrity and accountability of the spending of tax dollars. According to
the leaked documents,
the value of tax dollars is "undermined"
by management practices that do not adequately adhere to the
guiding values of fairness, access, transparency and representativeness.
The City of Greater
Sudbury bureaucrats continually hired private lawyers instead of utilizing
their internal legal staff. The legal service department consists of 4
lawyers and 11 staff members and costs taxpayers 1.2 million dollars
According to the leaked
documents from Human Resources and Organizational Development
division, Nick Benkovich, Director of water and wastewater Services, and Kevin Fowke, of
the Human Resources and Organizational Development, continually hired the
same lawyer Mireille Khoraych, outsourced from the same Toronto-based
legal firm. The leaked document states:
"Benkovcih and Fowke entitled to counsel of their choice, and that
counsel has always been Ms. Khoraych".
This clearly indicates
that certain groups of individuals and legal firms are benefitting from
the legal fees scam. During the 2014 year alone, the City spent $417,00.00
tax dollars on seeking legal advising from external lawyers. The issue of
nepotism has reached an alarming level and the human resources and legal
services divisions are both failing to address any issues in the best
interest of taxpayers. They
continually utilized public funds for their own personal interest and even
to cover up their wrong doings. The
taxpayers have been scammed and a large amount of tax dollars have been
In order to protect third
party economic interests, WikiLeaks Sudbury will not disclose any
identifiable information concerning the Toronto based legal firm.
In the public sphere,
favoritism, cronyism, and nepotism also undermine the common good. Favoritism
is often covert and undercuts the transparency that should be a key part
of municipal governmental operations. Despite this common sense value in
moral, the City’s bureaucrats have created their own dynasty utilizing
tax dollars. Furthermore, this leaked document clearly displays evidence
that Fowke and Benkovich are foolish enough to show the public their
under-hand deals, which were in reality a cost to the tax payers.
Benkovich's and Fowke's activities—defrauding public funds, are now
exposed and as such these bureaucrats should provide taxpayers with
The new political
leadership in the City of Greater Sudbury must take action against those
corrupted bureaucrats before it is too late.
Benkovcih and Fowke
entitled to counsel of their choice, and that counsel has always been Ms.
Released on April 05, 2014 at 17:30 EDT
This research paper initially
published on Law
and Social Inquiry,
39 (1), 62-65. Brief overview and excerpts from the article as
Funding the Cause: How
Public Interest Law Organizations Fund their Activities and why it Matters
for Social Change
interest law organizations (PILOs) are unusual in that most of their
work does not make money. They often represent clients who cannot afford
private counsel. They take on expensive systemic reform cases with
potentially far-reaching effects, but little chance for financial gain.
They engage in non-revenue-generating activities that private lawyers
seldom do, including community outreach and education, talking with the
media, organizing coalitions, participating in demonstrations, providing
advice and assistance to help individuals resolve their legal disputes,
and training law students. Although these activities are essential to the
law reform and social change goals of these organizations, they do not
resemble the business-like model of modern private law offices.
explaining the development of the field of public interest law vary. Some
comparative studies seem to assume that the public interest field simply
evolved naturally, its changing nature the product of maturation over time
within expanding welfare state societies . A less descriptive view is that
the expansion of public interest law, particularly of legal aid for the
poor, served the interests of both the legal profession and societies
based on capitalist economies. States, it was argued, could mollify the
working class and poor by granting a range of welfare rights; at the same
time, the legal profession could avoid undertaking the massive pro bono
efforts that might otherwise be necessary to legitimate and sustain the
legal system. Other explanations focus on how political forces have shaped
the field of public interest law, allowing expansion during progressive
times and forcing contraction and retrenchment with conservative shifts in
the political climate.
organizational theories offer another possible interpretation: multiple
PILO prototypes consolidated into one or two organizational forms as
advocates followed the lead of successful organizations, Legal Defense
Fund. As PILOs became taken for granted strategies for pursuing social
change, perhaps new organizations mimicked the form of successful older
organizations. Through this mimetic iso-morphism, a uniform organizational
design may have diffused across practice areas and political orientations.
Similar legal and political
environments also may have produced commonalities among PILOs. To the
extent that PILOs respond to common requirements imposed by funders as
well as government rules for nonprofits, coercive isomorphism may
contribute to structural uniformity among PILOs despite their diverse
missions. Indeed, research suggests that PILOs with similar forms now span
political orientation and practice area boundaries.
theories suggest an answer to the puzzling question of why lawyers,
foundations, and the public would support public interest law financially.
They help explain why welfare states might fund legal representation as a
poverty benefit, why legal professionals might donate their time and money
to organizations that could be viewed as competitors, and how
organizations might come to adopt similar funding structures across
strikingly diverse subject areas and ideological lines. What they do not
tell us, however, is how funding strategies might generate variation among
PILOs, shape PILOs' strategies for social change, and affect their
independence from political interference and attack.
primary objections to pro bono representation, at least as a replacement
for public interest organizations, are that private lawyers lack poverty
experience, private lawyers may refuse to take certain cases due to
(perceived) positional conflicts with their paying clients, and that
diffuse private representation undermines the ability to seek systemic
reform. Of course, pro bono representation avoids the restrictions on
advocacy and political vulnerability that go along with government
funding. Neverthelss, pro bono representation may trade political
constraints for economic constraints: firm commitments to pro bono
representation may waiver when the demand from paying clients for their
lawyers' services is strong enough to absorb their lawyers' available
time. In addition, empirical evidence suggests pro bono efforts respond to
market forces in more subtle ways, expanding when the profession perceives
that its jurisdictional control over legal services is under siege, and
contracting when control over the provision of legal services seems
secure. These dynamics do not necessarily track fluctuations in the need
for pro bono representation.
alternative would be to increase foundation and private support for public
interest organizations, which again would avoid the restrictions and
political vulnerability that come with government funding. Not all causes
are easy to sell to the foundation or private giving market, however. In
addition, foundation support brings a subtle coercion of its own: to the
extent that foundations develop their own funding priorities, then seek
worthy programs to fund, public interest organizations may find themselves
adjusting their agendas to chase resources, giving up their autonomy over
defining their priorities. To alleviate this concern, progressive
foundations might take a page from the conservative foundation playbook
and devote more resources to general operating support, rather than
start-up funds for individual, targeted programs. To be sure, not every
organization that relies on foundation or private support will be co-opted
by the interests of its benefactors. When organizations have diverse
sources of support, and missions that closely track those of their
foundation supporters, they will be less likely to be drawn away from
their initial goals.
April 05, 2015
C. R.,Nielsen, L. B. (2014). Funding the Cause: How Public
Interest Law Organizations Fund Their Activities and Why It
Matters for Social Change, Law
and Social Inquiry, 39 (1), 62-65.
the Cause: How Public Interest Law Organizations Fund Their
Activities and Why It Matters for Social Change